Text I
[1] Why do we care so strongly about what other people do, even when their actions won't affect us? And how do we decide that someone else has done something wrong? These questions are at the heart of moral psychology, and psychologists' answers to these questions have changed with intellectual fashion. Historically, psychologists have disagreed about whether moral judgments are primarily products of emotional and non-rational processes or of reasoning and 'higher' cognition-thinking. Recently, however, findings from several areas of cognitive neuroscience have begun to agree on an answer: emotions and reasoning both matter, but automatic emotional processes tend to dominate.

1. What is the main role of paragraph [1] in Text I?

a. It raises the issue of intellectual fashion. 知の流行り廃り
b. It explains the purpose of cognitive neuroscience. 認知神経科学の目的
c. It provides examples of moral judgments. 道徳的判断の事例
d. It introduces what the text is about. 本文への導入部

d:Recently, however, findings from several areas of cognitive neuroscience have begun to agree on an answer: emotions and reasoning both matter, but automatic emotional processes tend to dominate.から、正解とする。

[2] During the cognitive revolution of the 1950s and 1960s, behaviorist and Freudian theories gave way to mental models and information processing as the preferred framework in psychology. In the moral domain, Lawrence Kohlberg was a part of this revolution. According to Kohlberg, moral growth is driven not by simple brain maturation but rather by experience in 'role taking', or looking at a problem from multiple perspectives. Role taking improves moral reasoning, and moral reasoning, Kohlberg thought, drivesmoral judgment.
1950~1960年代の認知革命の時代に、心理学で主流だった枠組みとしての、行動主義やフロイト学派の理論は、メンタルモデル? や情報処理に道を譲った。道徳の領域では、ローレンス•コールバーグがこの革命の一翼を担った。コールバーグによれば、道徳的成長は単なる脳の成熟ではなく、「role taking いろんな役を演ずること」の経験、あるいは、問題を複数の観点から見ることを原動力とする。role takingは道徳的推理を向上させ、道徳的推理は道徳的判断をくだすと、コールバーグは考えた。

[3] But as the cognitive revolution matured in the 1980s, many researchers began calling for a complementary
'affective revolution'. Kohlberg's focus on moral reasoning seemed to ignore the importance of moral emotions. At the same time, new findings in evolutionary psychology and primatology - the study of apes - began to point to the origins of human morality in a set of emotions (linked to expanding cognitive abilities) that make individuals care about the welfare of others, including feelings of sympathy, and about cooperation, cheating, and norm-following, including feelings of shame, gratitude and vengeance.

[4] In the 1990s, the affective revolution was reinforced by a new focus on 'automaticity'- the mind's ability to solve many problems, including high-level social ones, unconsciously and automatically. A recent comprehensive model, the social intuitionist model, brings together research on automaticity with findings in neuroscience and theory in evolutionary psychology. This model suggests that moral judgment is much like aesthetic judgment: we see an action or hear a story and we have an instant feeling of approval or disapproval. These feelings are best thought of as affect-laden intuitions, as they appear suddenly and effortlessly in consciousness, with an affective valence (good or bad), but without any feelings of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion. ( A ) – for example, about reciprocity, loyalty, purity, suffering - are shaped by natural selection, as well as by cultural forces. People certainly do engage ill moral reasoning, but these processes are typically one-sided efforts in support of (a) Pre-ordained conclusions. ( As Williams James said, 'A great many people think they are thinking when they are merely rearranging their prejudices.' ) Moral reasoning matters, but it matters primarily in social contexts in which people try to influence each other and reach consensus with friends and allies.
1990年代には、感情革命は「automaticity 自動性(無意識のなかでおこなわれる)」— 精神の無意識かつ自動的に、高レベルの社会的問題を含む多くの問題を解決する能力 ― に、新たに注目して活気づいた。最近の包括的モデルであるintuitionist社会的直感モデルは、自動性に関する研究に、神経科学の研究結果や進化心理学の理論を取り入れる。このモデルは、道徳的判断は美的判断によく似ていることを示唆している。つまり、私たちはある行動を見たり、物語を聞いたりすると、瞬時に好悪の気持ちを抱くという。こうした気持ちは、感情のvalence(よいか悪いか)を伴うが、 詮索、証拠の考察、あるいは結論の推測段階を経た気持ちなしに、突然かつストレートに表れるので、感情を多く含むと考えるべきである。(こうした気持ち)—例えば、相互性、忠誠心、清廉、苦難について—は文化的影響力だけでなく、自然選択的によっても形作られる。人は確かに道徳的推理にかかわるが、こうしたプロセスは、一般的には、予め決まった結論を支持する一方的な行動なのである。(ウィリアムズ・ジェームズが述べたように、「非常に多くの人が自分では考えていると思っているが、実は自分の偏見を並べ直しているにすぎないのである」)道徳的推理は重要だが、それは本来、人々が友人や同僚と影響を与え合い、合意に至ろうとする社会的文脈の中においてのみ重要なのである。

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